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Abstract 
Crown financial policy is concerned with how the government manages the Crown￿s 
assets and liabilities.  The recently established New Zealand Superannuation Fund, which 
is projected to grow to around 45% of GDP over the next few decades, highlights that 
Crown financial policy is likely to become an important economic policy tool with potential 
to have a significant impact on New Zealand economic welfare. 
The policy framework of objectives, targets and instruments is adopted as a basis for 
organising the theory literature relating to Crown financial policy.  Applying this framework, 
seven distinct policy objectives are identified as potentially relevant to the future 
development of policy.  Applying qualitative assessment criteria, it is concluded that four 
of the seven objectives should be the main factors that inform the design of alternative 
policy options.  The four objectives relate to minimising distortionary taxation, time-
consistency of policy, agency costs of government, and downside efficiency risks.  The 
three objectives considered less relevant relate to policy neutrality, missing markets and 
risk management services.   
The four main objectives imply a range of targets could be adopted for the Crown balance 
sheet, some of which would be conflicting.  The objectives of minimising distortionary 
taxation suggests targeting the minimum risk portfolio by building up financial assets and 
net worth whereas the objective of minimising the agency cost of government suggests 
placing an upper bound on government operating surpluses and limiting the build up of 
financial assets.  Time-consistency and agency cost objectives tend to conflict because 
the former suggests the level of debt should be kept low whereas the latter suggests high 
debt levels. 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION  H11  
H63 
 
KEYWORDS  Agency cost; bounded rationality; Crown balance sheet; 
distortionary taxation; imperfect and incomplete capital markets; 
public debt management; Ricardian equivalence; time-
inconsistency;  
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Crown financial policy specifies how the government manages the Crown￿s assets and 
liabilities.
1
  Policy analysis in this area is concerned with how the structure and size of the 
Crown balance sheet could affect the decisions of citizens in managing their own wealth 
portfolios and also government decisions on fiscal and other economic policies.  Crown 
financial policy is closely related to corporate financial policy, which is concerned with how 
a company￿s balance sheet could affect the decisions of shareholders and managers. 
The Treasury has conducted research on Crown financial policy in one form or another 
since at least the mid-1990s.  Skilling (1997) and Davis (2001) summarise and develop 
the literature relevant to Crown financial policy, while Grimes (2001a) discusses the 
operational objectives and practices relevant to managing the Crown￿s balance sheet.
2
  
Empirical analyses by Huther (1998), Fabling (2002) and Davis and Fabling (2002) have 
found tentative evidence that it may be possible to improve the performance of the Crown 
balance sheet.   
At a practical level, changes in the Crown balance sheet impact on the government￿s 
fiscal performance.  An example is the financial year 2002/03, where a partial revaluation 
of the Crown balance sheet reduced the government￿s operating surplus (based on 
accrual accounting) from $4 billion to $1.4 billion.  This adjustment amounts to around 6% 
of Core Crown revenue.
3
 
Crown financial policy is likely to become progressively more important as the recently 
established New Zealand Superannuation Fund accumulates financial assets over the 
next few decades equivalent to 45% of GDP or around $56 billion in current terms.
4
  If 
these funds accumulate as projected, then a 10 basis point (or 0.1%) improvement 
                                                                 
1 This paper uses the term Crown financial policy to mean government policies relating to the management of the Crown￿s aggregate 
balance sheet.  The Crown balance sheet includes the Crown￿s ownership interest in state-owned enterprises and other central 
government assets and liabilities meeting Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) but excludes Local Authority assets and 
liabilities.  A wider definition of Crown financial policy would include measurement issues, financial reporting and performance and 
accountability issues but these are excluded for the purposes of this paper.   
2 International contributions include Bohn (1990, 1995), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), Leong (1999), Lucas and Stokey (1983), 
and Missale (1997, 1999). 
3 See Crown Financial Statements at http://www.treasury.govt.nz/. 
4 McCulloch and Frances (2001) describes the New Zealand Superannuation Fund.  
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(decline) in annual returns at the same risk level would confer a net present value gain 
(loss) to New Zealand of around $1 billion (at 5% discount rate). 
Purpose of this paper 
A key purpose of this paper is to organise the theoretical literature within a coherent policy 
framework to provide a basis for comparing policy recommendations.  A second key 
purpose is to select a subset of key concepts that should inform the design of alternative 
policy options for Crown financial policy.   
Organising framework 
This paper adopts the framework of objectives, targets, and instruments.  Objectives are 
high-level qualitative statements of intent, targets are quantitative expressions intended to 
give effect to the qualitative objectives, and instruments are policy levers subject to the 
control of the authorities.  By way of example, in the New Zealand monetary policy regime 
the overall policy objective (as specified in the Reserve Bank Act 1989) is to ￿maintain 
price stability￿, the current policy target is medium term inflation in the range of 1-3% p.a. 
and the policy instrument is the Official Cash Rate. 
The Crown balance sheet may be viewed as an instrument, as policy makers ultimately 
have control over the gross size and structure of the balance sheet.  The discussion in 
this paper shows that the Crown balance sheet potentially could be targeted at a wide 
range of markedly different policy objectives, each contributing to overall economic 
welfare.
5
   
In the case of some objectives, the literature also suggests that other non-balance sheet 
instruments may be available to achieve the desired objective.  Examples may be found in 
the form of institutional arrangements such as the Reserve Bank Act 1989 and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994 and various regulatory and social policies. 
The task for policy makers, therefore, is an instrument assignment problem.  Policy 
makers need to identify the various potential objectives, identify the balance sheet and 
other possible instruments, and determine the best mapping of instruments to objectives.  
The optimal assignment is that which would maximise New Zealand economic welfare.  
Policy targets are specified as part of the implementation regime for guiding the 
adjustment of instruments to achieve objectives.  
Structure of paper 
The paper has the following structure.  The next section (Section 2) provides a brief 
overview of seven policy objectives identified in the literature.   Sections 3 ￿ 9 discuss in 
turn the motivation for each objective and summarise the implications for setting of policy 
targets and instruments.  Section 10 summarises the policy targets associated with each 
objective. 
Up to this point I avoid, as far as possible, assessing empirically or judgementally the 
significance and relative importance of the objectives.  I depart from this approach in the 
                                                                 
5 The list of objectives could include political objectives where a current government may act strategically to constrain the political 
choices of a future government, e.g. cutting taxes to run large budget deficits specifically for the purpose of inhibiting other political 
parties from campaigning on policies favouring higher government expenditure.  Political objectives of this nature are excluded in this 
paper, which instead focuses on economic efficiency objectives as the basis for maximising economic welfare.  For discussion of the 
political economy of fiscal policy , see Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Milesi-Ferretti (1995).  
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penultimate section.  In Section 11 a set of criteria are developed and applied to assess a 
priori whether any of the seven objectives identified earlier should be omitted from further 
consideration in the development of policy options.  This section also discusses at a high 
level the conflicts between the selected policy objectives.  Conclusions are discussed in  
Section 12. 
2  Overview of potential objectives 
The Ricardian equivalence theorem suggests that Crown financial policy may have no 
impact on economic welfare.
6
  However, as noted above, previous analysis conducted 
within and outside the Treasury has identified wide-ranging situations where Crown 
financial policy would matter for economic welfare.   
The potential for real effects raises the obvious question as to how policy should be set to 
maximise economic welfare.  Skilling (1997) argued that the Crown should only manage 
risk to the extent that it is efficient to do so.  He developed a high-level framework based 
on efficient management and efficient provision.  The efficient management argument is 
that the Crown balance sheet should be managed in a manner that imposes the least cost 
on the economy as a whole.  The efficient provision argument is that the Crown should 
manage risk because citizens are risk averse and are constrained from diversifying their 
Crown exposure.  Skilling considered that comparative institutional analysis leads to 
rejection of the efficient provision argument.  
This section drills down below Skilling￿s high-level framework to develop a more detailed 
framework for organising the literature relevant to Crown financial policy.  A review of the 
theoretical literatures on capital markets, optimal public debt management, time-
consistency of fiscal and monetary policy, the principal-agent approach to public sector 
management identifies a minimum of seven potential objectives may be identified.  These 
are: 
1.  maximise the potential for the gross size and composition of the Crown balance 
sheet to be neutral for economic welfare (relates to Ricardian equivalence 
literature);  
2.  minimise the expected economic value of deadweight losses (relates to tax-
smoothing literature); 
3.  minimise the risk of unstable fiscal and monetary policies (relates to time-
consistency literature); 
4.  minimise the agency cost of government (relates to principal-agent literature); 
5.  maximise opportunities for efficient risk sharing through provision of market-maker 
services (relates to incomplete capital markets literature); 
                                                                 
6 The Ricarian Equivalence theorem (Barro 1974) states the conditions under which the choice between financing government 
expenditure by taxes or by issuing debt has no impact on the real economy.  The equivalence result holds only under restrictive 
assumptions about citizens￿ altruism and rationality, completeness and efficiency of financial markets, and lump-sum taxes.  Closely 
related to Ricardian Equivalence is the Neutrality Theorem of Debt Management (Missale 1999) which states under similar conditions 
that ￿public debt management￿ has no impact on the real economy.  Public debt management includes the choice of denomination and 
maturity of the securities to issue, indexation features, changes in the relative supply of existing securities, and innovations in the menu 
of public assets.  
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6.  achieve citizens￿ desired wealth portfolio and risk tolerance through provision of risk 
management services (relates to literatures on bounded rationality, moral hazard, 
and capital market imperfections); and 
7.  minimise downside efficiency risk, particularly the risk of exacerbating existing 
inefficiencies or creating new sources of inefficiency in the private sector (relates to 
wide range of literatures noted above). 
The above ordering does not imply relative importance.  The objectives have been 
grouped consistently with Skilling￿s (1997) high-level framework: 
•   Policy neutrality:  Objective 1 concerns the base case where Crown financial policy 
would be irrelevant for economic welfare.  
•   Efficient management:  Objectives 2 - 4 concern how Crown financial policy may 
affect economic welfare through the management of government affairs.  
•   Efficient provision:  Objectives 5 - 7 concern how Crown financial policy may affect 
economic welfare through the provision of services to the public, such as market 
making and risk management services.   
Sections 3 ￿ 9 discuss each objective in turn.  Each section discusses the factors 
motivating the objective and presents key insights in terms of policy targets that may be 
appropriate and possible instruments.  
Taking forward all seven objectives to inform the design of alternative policy options would 
be undesirable.  For this reason, Section 11 develops and applies a set of criteria to 
assess whether any objectives should be rejected from further consideration.  The 
analysis concludes that four of the objectives relating to distortionary taxation, time-
consistency of policy, agency costs of government, and downside efficiency risks should 
be the main factors that inform the design of alternative policy options.   
Definition of Crown balance sheet 
Throughout this paper the terms ￿Crown balance sheet￿ and ￿Crown portfolio￿ are defined 
in accordance with Comprehensive Net Worth (CNW) (Bradbury et al 1999).  This is an 
economics concept that means the balance sheet includes the present value of future 
taxation revenue and the present value of the government￿s social obligations to citizens.  
CNW is broader than the GAAP-based accounting definition of net worth as published in 
the Crown Financial Statements.   
It is recognised that available information may be insufficient to allow implementation on 
CNW basis and that actual policy implementations would likely be based on a narrower 
definition of the Crown balance sheet.  However, CNW is useful for analytical purposes. 
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3 Policy  neutrality 
Economic objective 
The economic objective assumed in this section is to maximise the potential for the gross 
size and composition of the Crown balance sheet to be neutral for economic welfare.   
Two sets of motivations are available in support of this objective.  First, if Ricardian 
equivalence held:   
•   citizens would achieve their desired wealth portfolio irrespective of the size and 
structure of the Crown balance sheet; and 
•   the government could focus on operating policies without having to take into 
account balance sheet considerations. 
Second, two further motivations are available on the basis that Ricardian equivalence is 
unlikely to hold perfectly:   
•   since any policy setting inevitably has potential of being in error, the more closely 
that policy neutrality holds the less detriment to economic welfare arising from errors 
in Crown financial policy; and 
•   proposed policies to improve economic welfare may be rejected on the basis of 
comparative institutional analysis.  In this case, Crown financial policy should 
promote conditions consistent with minimising the adverse real impacts of policy on 
economic welfare. 
Key insights for policy 
Ricardian equivalence implies that Crown financial policy is indeterminate in the sense 
that all policy options achieve the same optimum level of economic welfare.  Citizens 
would rearrange their personal portfolios to undo any changes in the stochastic properties 
of their exposure to the Crown portfolio.  Economic efficiency would require only that 
citizens￿ personal portfolios be on the Capital Market Line (CML), as illustrated below.
7
  
Notably, however, citizens￿ sub-portfolios such as the Crown balance sheet do not need to 
lie on the CML. 
Nevertheless, Ricardian equivalence would not imply that Crown financial policy should be 
left undetermined.  To construct optimal personal portfolios, citizens would need to know 
the stochastic properties of their exposure to the Crown.  This suggests that an objective 
for Crown financial policy could be to minimise the risk that citizens misperceive the 
Crown￿s policy settings, particularly its risk/return targets.  On this basis, the government￿s 
policy settings should be explicit, transparent (hence, easily communicated) and signalled 
prior to implementation.  This could suggest extra Crown reporting requirements, possibly 
involving changes to the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the situation in risk/return space.  The figure shows the Crown 
portfolio lying inside the efficient frontier at an announced risk/return point.  Under the 
                                                                 
7 The Capital Market Line is the linear efficient set obtained by taking combinations of the riskfee asset and the market portfolio 
(Copeland and Weston 1988).  An investor may achieve a portfolio with less risk than the market portfolio by investing a portion of his 
or her available funds in the riskfree asset and the remainder in the market portfolio.  A portfolio with risk greater than the market 
portfolio may be achieved by borrowing the riskfree asset and investing all funds (including borrowings) in the market portfolio.   
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Ricardian assumptions, citizens￿ total wealth portfolios would lie on the CML at points 
reflecting each individual￿s level of risk aversion. 










Summary on policy neutrality 
 
Economic objective: 
Maximise the potential for gross size and composition of the Crown balance sheet to be neutral 
for economic welfare 
CFP objectives:  
Minimise the risk that citizens misperceive policy settings (especially risk/return targets) 
Targets:  
No specific targets identified as optimal.  For purposes of transparency, the government should 
announce a risk/return target but otherwise may allow the Crown balance sheet to evolve as 
residual of government operating policies.   
Instruments:  
Legislative provisions that ensure risk/return and other policies are explicit and transparent, and 












Efficient frontier  
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4 Distortionary  taxation 
Economic objective 
The economic objective of tax smoothing is to minimise the economic value of the 
deadweight losses of taxation. 
The motivation for this objective is that taxes, due to their involuntary nature, create 
incentives for taxpayers to substitute away from taxed activities toward activities that are 
not taxed, or are taxed at lower marginal rates.  If the taxed activities would otherwise be 
worthwhile, the substitution reduces welfare and creates a deadweight loss.     
An appropriate policy objective is to minimise the deadweight losses of taxation subject to 
satisfying the Crown￿s inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC).
8
 
Key insights for policy 
The literature shows that detailed conclusions about alternative policies depend on the 
assumptions made regarding departures from the other Ricardian conditions, e.g. whether 
capital markets are imperfect and/or incomplete and whether citizens alter their other 
wealth portfolios response to changes in the Crown balance sheet.  These are discussed 
below. 
Though not analysed specifically in the literature, the shape of the deadweight loss 
function also has important implications for Crown financial policy.  The standard case 
assumed in the literature is that the deadweight loss function is convex in the tax rate, with 
the result that minimising the variability of the tax rate would maximise economic welfare.  
However, it is an open empirical question as to whether the losses due to variability in the 
tax rate are economically significant to the extent that a policy response would be 
warranted.  It is therefore of interest to consider implications for policy in the case where 
the deadweight loss function is linear in the tax rate.  The discussion below analyses the 
cases for both linear and convex deadweight loss functions. 
The results reported in this section (and throughout the paper) were derived from models 
where distortionary taxation affects the level of economic activity but not the growth rate.  
The omission of policy conclusions relating specifically to economic growth reflects the 
absence of suitable models in the literature, which thus far has focused on how taxes 
impact on long-run equilibrium growth but not the impacts of alternative time profiles of the 
tax rate or uncertainty about the tax rate.
9
  This is an area where further development 
could produce important insights for policy.   
The cases discussed in following subsections are: 
•   linear loss function;  
•   convex loss function;  
•   incomplete capital markets;  
                                                                 
8 The inter-temporal budget constraint requires that at any date the sum of net worth as at that date plus net present value of future tax 
revenue be greater than or equal to the net present value of future government spending. 
9 See, for example, Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992) and Gemmell and Kneller (2003).  
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•   misperceptions of default risk;  and 
•  non-responsive  citizens. 
4.1  Linear loss function 
Assume all other non-tax related conditions for Ricardian equivalence hold.  If the 
economic loss or ￿excess burden￿ were linear in the tax rate, economic welfare may be 
affected by the long-run average tax rate but not by the time profile or variability of the tax 
rate.  Tax smoothing is irrelevant.  Under linearity, the appropriate tax policy objective 
would be to minimise the long-run average tax rate so as to minimise deadweight losses 
on average over time. 
Government spending policy is a key determinant of the long run tax rate.  Another 
determinant is the composition of the Crown balance sheet, since net returns on the 
Crown portfolio flow into the government￿s Operating Balance.  An immediate implication, 
in contrast to Section 3, is that all diversifiable risks should be hedged so that the Crown 
portfolio lies on the CML.  This would ensure maximum expected portfolio returns for any 
given level of portfolio risk, as illustrated in Figure 2 below.   
Less obvious is that Crown financial policy should be indifferent to positions along the 
CML.
10
 Intuition suggests that the tax policy objective of minimising the average tax rate, 
combined with the irrelevance of tax smoothing under linearity, would imply the Crown 
should leverage to the maximum extent possible to generate expected portfolio returns at 
the highest possible level, i.e. move up and rightward along the CML.  The higher 
expected returns would reduce the expected tax rate, thereby reducing deadweight 
losses.   










                                                                 
10 This result assumes that citizens would be able to engage in short-selling to maintain their desired overall risk profile if were to adopt 
high risk positions along the CML.  As discussed in Section 4.5, if citizens cannot engage in short-selling then government should 
adopt a low risk portfolio. 
CML






along CML  
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However, this is a fallacy where citizens are risk averse. The problem is that moving the 
portfolio up and rightward along the CML incurs systematic risk.
11
  In equilibrium, the 
assets offering high expected returns are precisely those assets which offer high payoffs 
in states where marginal utility is low, and low payoffs in states where marginal utility is 
high.  The high expected return is compensation for this unfortunate distribution of payoffs 
(relative to the distribution of marginal utility).  As a result, Crown investments in high 
return assets tends to achieve low taxes (and low deadweight losses) in periods where 
citizens are doing well, and high taxes (and high deadweight losses) in periods where 
citizens are doing badly.  Overall, after taking into account that citizens can achieve their 
desired risk/return position on their total wealth portfolio, a Crown strategy of investing in 
high return assets would be neutral for economic welfare.
12
   
Summary for linear loss function 
 
Economic objective: 
Minimise the expected economic value of deadweight losses of taxation  
CFP objectives:  
Tax policy: Minimise the long-run average tax rate subject to IBC 
Portfolio policy: Ensure Crown portfolio lies on CML 
Target:  
Zero diversifiable risk  
Instruments:  
Portfolio weights as appropriate 
 
4.2  Convex loss function
13 
A convex deadweight loss function is the standard assumption in the literature.  In this 
case, Bohn (1990, 1995) shows that Crown financial policy should minimise the variability 
of the tax rate.  This conclusion is due to two factors:  
•   a convex deadweight loss function places the Crown sub-portfolio at a comparative 
disadvantage by increasing the spread of returns (net of tax): Bad returns on the 
Crown portfolio are very bad because they induce higher tax rates (and therefore 
higher deadweight losses) while good returns are very good because they induce 
lower taxes (though convexity means the reduction in deadweight losses is 
proportionately smaller than the increase in bad states).  An identical portfolio held 
directly by an individual would have lower variance of returns; and 
•   assets offering high expected returns have an unfortunate distribution of payoffs, in 
the sense that their payoffs tend to be high in states when consumption is high (low 
                                                                 
11 The systematic risk of a portfolio is the risk that cannot be avoided by diversifying the portfolio across the risky assets available in 
the (global) economy, so that returns on the portfolio will vary with the economy (Copeland and Weston 1988).  The systematic risk of 
a portfolio can be altered by increasing or decreasing the proportion of the portfolio invested in the safe asset (proxied by government 
bonds). 
12 This is discussed further in Section 4.2. 
13 The analysis in this section assumes the deadweight loss function is not state-contingent.  If the deadweight loss function is state-
contingent then a tax policy objective of minimising the variance of the tax rate is not optimal.  For example, if the labour supply 
elasticity varies with the state of the economy, then minimising the excess burden requires the labour income tax rate to vary with the 
state of the economy (see Scott, 1999).  The results apply to both linear and convex deadweight loss functions.  However, the policy 
implications are not considered further in this paper on the basis that implementation would require a capability for ￿fine tuning￿ that is 
not available to policy makers.   
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marginal utility) and low when consumption is low (high marginal utility).  The high 
expected return is compensation for this unfortunate distribution of payoffs (relative 
to the distribution of marginal utility).  Citizens wish to invest in such assets only up 
to the point where the marginal utility of higher average consumption equals the 
marginal disutility of higher variability of consumption.   
The Crown￿s comparative disadvantage exacerbates the unfortunate distribution of 
payoffs from ￿high return￿ assets.  Thus, citizens would prefer to use one or more of their 
own sub-portfolios other than the Crown sub-portfolio to optimise their holdings of risky 
assets.  For these reasons, the Crown is best assigned the task of immunising its portfolio 
to eliminate citizens exposure to the Crown.  This means that the Crown should target the 
zero-variance portfolio,
14
 i.e. zero diversifiable and systematic risk.  The Appendix 
provides a more detailed intuitive explanation of Bohn￿s result.   
Instruments to achieve zero-variance portfolio 
Consistent with the assumption of complete capital markets, most theoretical contributions 
favouring the zero-variance portfolio assume the government can issue and purchase 
state-contingent securities as desired to hedge all risks.
15
   
An exception is Angeletos (2002), who shows in the context of a closed-economy 
equilibrium business cycle model that almost every risk can be hedged with non-
contingent debt of different maturities.  Angeletos presents a stylised example where a 
government implements the optimal portfolio policy by selling perpetuities and investing in 
short-term assets.   Critical to his result is that shocks to government expenditure and/or 
the tax base affect the equilibrium interest rate, causing movements in the market value of 
long term debt greater than movements in the market value of short-term assets.  
Summary for convex losses (with complete and perfect markets) 
 
Economic objective: 
Minimise the expected economic value of the deadweight loss of taxation  
CFP objectives:  
Tax policy: Minimise variance of the tax rate subject to IBC 
Portfolio policy: Minimise variance of the Crown portfolio 
Target:  
Zero variance Crown portfolio  
Instruments:  
(a)  contingent securities, e.g. issue contingent debt with returns negatively indexed to public 
spending and positively indexed to productivity and other shocks to the tax base;  
(b) debt maturity structure, e.g. issue perpetuities and purchase short-term assets; and 
(c)   any combination of market securities with appropriate covariances. 
 
 
                                                                 
14 As noted in Section 3, all references to Crown balance sheet and Crown portfolio are in terms of Comprehensive Net Worth (CNW). 
15 Lucas & Stokey (1983), Bohn (1990, 1995), King (1990), and Chari et. al. (1994).  
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4.3  Incomplete capital markets  
Thus far the analysis has assumed all Ricardian assumptions hold except those relating to 
tax distortions.  This and the following subsections depart from the various Ricardian 
assumptions, while continuing to assume the deadweight loss function is convex.   
The current subsection summarises the case where some fiscal risks cannot be hedged.  
The absence of hedging opportunities may be due to incomplete capital markets or simply 
that the Crown is unable to access certain markets or use particular instruments.  Lack of 
access to particular markets or instruments may be due to asymmetric information issues 
and moral hazard incentives relating to government spending policy.  These are 
discussed further in Sections 5 and 7.  For the purposes of this section, the distinction 
between incompleteness and lack of access is irrelevant.  The key underlying assumption 
is that the Crown faces a comparative disadvantage in managing citizens￿ risk/return 
exposure.  
Given the Crown￿s comparative disadvantage, the optimal tax policy is the same policy 
objective as the previous section, i.e. minimise the variability of tax rates.  Similarly, the 
optimal portfolio policy objective is to minimise the variance of the Crown portfolio.   
Although the tax and portfolio objectives are unaltered, the assumption of incomplete 
markets restricts the instruments the Crown has available to achieve its policy objectives.  
Bohn (1995) shows that the optimal policy now has two parts: 
•   hedge to the fullest extent possible using available securities; and 




Building a precautionary balance would require the tax rate to be held temporarily higher 
than otherwise.  The cost of additional deadweight losses is worthwhile if and only if the 
unhedged risks would otherwise result in a negative correlation between tax rates and 
consumption.  The rationale is similar to the previous section, and relates to the high cost 
in terms of forgone utility if tax rates have to be increased in states where consumption is 
already low (i.e. high marginal utility).  Building up a buffer has value to the extent that the 
unfortunate timing of changes in tax rates can be avoided. 
In contrast, if unhedged risks result in tax rates and consumption being positively 
correlated then tax adjustments facilitate consumption smoothing.  Building a 
precautionary balance would remove this beneficial effect while also imposing deadweight 
losses due to temporarily higher tax rates.  If the correlation between tax rates and 
consumption is zero or positive, the Crown should target CNW at zero, i.e. just satisfy the 
government inter-temporal budget constraint. 
Whether the Crown should target a positive net worth buffer is an empirical issue.  It 
depends on which risks cannot be hedged and how these shocks impact on tax policy and 
consumer behaviour.   
                                                                 
16 Bradbury, Brumby and Skilling (1999, p.27-33) argue against building up a precautionary buffer on the basis that it would be more 
efficient for the Crown to breach the intertemporal budget constraint in response to temporary shocks.  However, they offer no formal 
modelling in support of their argument.  
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Instruments to achieve minimum-variance portfolio 
A substantive literature has developed analysing the hedging properties of marketable 
assets and observed debt instruments (in the absence of general state-contingent 
securities).   Alternative debt denominations include nominal debt, price-indexed debt, and 
foreign-currency denominated debt.  Short- versus long-term debt maturities have been 
analysed also.  The key conclusion is that the appropriate instrument is an empirical 
question.  The choice of debt denomination and maturity depends on the type of shocks 
hitting the economy and the serial and cross-correlations in macroeconomic variables 
within and across countries.   The main results, summarised from Missale (1997), are 
provided in the box below. 
Summary for incomplete markets 
 
Economic objective: 
Minimise the expected economic value of the deadweight loss of taxation  
CFP objectives:  
Tax policy: Minimise variance of tax rate  
Portfolio policy: Minimise variance of the Crown portfolio 
Targets:  
(a) minimum-variance portfolio (i.e. zero diversifiable risk and minimum systematic risk 
consistent with risks that cannot be hedged);  
(b) positive CNW buffer (if unhedged risks cause negative correlation between tax and 
consumption, otherwise target net worth at zero)  
Instruments:  
(a) buy (short-sell) assets whose returns have positive (negative) correlation to public spending 
and negative (positive) correlation to tax base;   
(b) choice of debt instruments is an empirical issue (see Missale 1997): 
•   nominal debt for government spending and productivity shocks; 
•   price-indexed debt for monetary and real demand shocks causing inflation; 
•   foreign currency debt when output and inflation shocks are correlated internationally; 
•   maturity structure of debt to match structure of planned fiscal surpluses; 
•   short maturity debt when positive correlation between output and real interest rates; and 
(c) tax rate, as instrument for building net worth buffer (if required)     
4.4  Misperceptions of default risk 
The risk premium paid by an issuer of debt securities depends on the degree of default 
risk perceived in the markets.  A poor reputation due to past actions, or simply 
characteristics similar to those of previous defaulters, may undermine the credibility of 
promises to honour debt obligations.  Hence, the potential exists that the financial markets 
may assess a probability of default on public debt even though the government may not 
intend to default under any circumstances.  The East Asian financial crisis is a recent 
example where cross-country contagion was a significant risk. 
In the event that a government faces an unjustified default premium on its debt, Bohn 
(1995) shows that the optimal portfolio policy is to reduce the level of debt until the 
unjustified premium reduces to zero.  If the unjustified premium is exogenous with respect 
to the level of debt, the optimal debt target is zero. 
The debt reduction may be achieved by sale of assets where this does not undermine risk 
diversification or other objectives.  In the absence of suitable asset sales, the optimal tax 
policy is to ￿tilt￿ the time profile of optimal taxes towards higher current taxes to pay down  
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debt to the target level.  In terms of deadweight losses, a temporarily high tax rate is worth 
incurring in return for achieving a permanently lower tax rate by avoiding the unjustified 
default premium.
17
   
The above argument may be refined in two ways: 
•   if the unjustified premium applies only to some types of debt (e.g. unjustified inflation 
risk on nominal debt), the optimal portfolio policy would place upper bounds on the 
particular instrument rather than debt reduction as a whole; and 
•   a risky security issued for hedging purposes to reduce fluctuations in the tax rate 
may reduce the probability of default.  In this case, the optimal portfolio policy would 
place lower bounds on securities performing this type of role.   
In addition to asset sales and temporarily higher tax rates, legislative provisions such as 
the Reserve Bank Act 1989 and Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 may help to reduce 
unjustified default premia.   Also important is a regulatory structure that underpins good 
corporate governance and private sector transparency, especially in the banking sector 
due to its central role in New Zealand of maintaining a stable financial system. 
Summary for unjustified default risk 
 
Economic objective: 
Minimise the expected economic value of the deadweight loss of taxation  
CFP objectives:  
Portfolio policy: Minimise costs arising from unjustified default premia 
Targets:  
For total debt or any instruments subject to unjustified default premia, set upper bound such that 
unjustified premium falls to zero  
Instruments:  
Sale of assets 
Tax rate  
Institutional arrangements (e.g. RBA 1989 and FRA 1994) 
4.5 Non-responsive  citizens 
Previous subsections have assumed that citizens adjust their total wealth portfolios in 
response to any change in Crown financial policy.  This subsection is concerned with the 
case where citizens do not respond to changes in Crown financial policy.  Possible 
reasons include bounded rationality, costly information, and capital market imperfections 
such as liquidity constraints, short-selling restrictions and transaction costs.  These are 
canvassed more fully in Section 8. 
Consider a situation where the government￿s objective is to minimise the expected value 
of deadweight losses (assumed to be convex in the tax rate).
18
  This differs from Bohn 
                                                                 
17 Bohn (1995, pp.69-73) provides several illustrative examples based on data for New Zealand in 1994.  In one example, where the 
unjustified default premium reduces to zero at 30% debt ratio, an initial debt of 55% of GDP would be paid down to 30% over 31 years.  
Bohn shows that the results are sensitive to the size of the unjustified default premium, share of debt held for foreign investors, and 
magnitude of tax distortions.  They would also be sensitive to any effect of the tax rate on the potential growth rate of the economy. 
18 Huther (1999) presents another approach where citizens also do not respond to changes in Crown financial policy.  The model, 
based on Froot and Stein￿s (1998) model for private sector entities, assumes some risks are non-tradable (i.e. incomplete markets), the  
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(1990, 1995), where the government￿s objective was to maximise the utility of a 
representative citizen.  A possible motivation for the new objective could be that the 
government does not possess detailed information about citizens￿ individual utility 
functions and current wealth portfolios or does not have the ability to construct a social 
welfare function through interpersonal comparisons.  This is consistent with the view that 
government lacks the information necessary to engage in ￿fine tuning￿ of policy. 
In the context where the objective is to minimise deadweight losses, Grimes and Davis 
(2001) show that perfect tax smoothing is no longer optimal.  Optimal Crown financial 
policy involves a trade-off between the level and variability of tax rates.  The Crown would 
invest a portion of the balance sheet in risky assets with high-expected returns (but 
possibly with no hedging benefits).  This would achieve lower deadweight losses through 
lower average tax rates.   
The intuition for the Grimes/Davis result relative to Bohn (1990, 1995) is straight- forward.  
First, the assumption that citizens do not respond to changes in Crown financial policy 
removes the Crown￿s comparative disadvantage ￿ in effect, the government becomes the 
only party able to manage the impact of the Crown on citizens￿ total wealth portfolio.   
Second, at the same time, the ￿no fine tuning￿ assumption causes the government to 
adopt a simple expected value criterion that takes no account of the correlation between 
payoffs on high-return assets and citizens￿ marginal utility.  The combination of these two 
effects causes the Bohn results to break down.
19
 
Summary for non-responsive citizens  
 
Economic objective: 
Minimise the expected deadweight loss of taxation  
CFP objectives:  
Tax policy: Minimise the expected value of deadweight losses 
Portfolio policy: Achieve risk/return portfolio consistent with tax policy objective 
Target:  
Specified level of systematic risk (exceeding minimum variance) 
Instruments:  
No specific information available 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
deadweight function is convex, and that the risk premium on borrowings is also convex in the level of borrowings.  Unfortunately, the 
government objective function assumed in Huther is ad hoc and only loosely related to economic efficiency objectives.   
19 Note that Bohn￿s results do not require government to possess a capacity for ￿fine tuning￿.  Bohn￿s core assumption that citizens 
respond optimally to changes in Crown financial policy allows the government to target the minimum-variance portfolio without 
requiring any knowledge of citizens￿ utility functions and wealth portfolios.  
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5  Time-consistency of policy  
Economic objective 
In this and following sections we turn away from distortionary taxation as the primary 
determinant of Crown financial policy.  In this section, the objective is to minimise the risk 
of creating unstable fiscal and monetary policies.   
The role of public debt structure in underpinning the time-consistency of fiscal and 
monetary policies has been recognised since at least Lucas and Stokey (1983).  In 
essence, any government with debt securities outstanding has an incentive to take actions 
that reduce the real value of debt.  Possible mechanisms for reducing the value of debt 
are outright repudiation, unexpected increases in capital income taxes, or unexpected 
inflation.   
The economic benefit of reducing the risk of time-inconsistency derives in part through 
stronger financial market credibility leading to lower default risk premia and therefore 
lower tax rates.  However, independent of the tax channel, economic benefits also accrue 
through avoiding inefficiencies that would arise as the private sector attempts to anticipate 
and react to an unstable policy. 
Key insights for policy 
Crown financial policy is determined by weighing the benefits of structuring the balance 
sheet to eliminate or reduce the incentive on government to act inconsistently over time 
versus the cost of self-imposed constraints that reduce flexibility to adjust to future 
shocks.  Consistent with the literature on adverse selection and moral hazard, there is a 
trade-off between incentive and insurance effects: structuring arrangements to provide 
insurance usually weakens the incentives for consistent behaviour while, conversely, 
creating strong incentives usually limits the scope for insurance.   
The key insights for policy are as follows:  
Debt denomination 
•   price-indexed and foreign-currency denominated debt avoid incentives to reduce the 
real value of debt through surprise inflation;
20
   
•   to the extent that incentive and insurance effects should be balanced, optimal policy 
implies that a proportion of debt securities should still be denominated in nominal 
terms;  
•   to sustain a reputational equilibrium (and therefore time-consistent policy), the 
incentive to reduce the real debt by unexpected inflation must not exceed the cost of 
lost reputation.  Loss of reputation has the character of a lumpy or fixed cost.  The 
implication for policy is to place upper bounds (as percent of GDP) on accumulation 
of nominal local currency debt, with the bound set to avoid the temptation for 
opportunistic behaviour;   
                                                                 
20 In New Zealand, the nominal capital gain to preserve the real value of price-indexed debt is taxed.  This appears to undermine 
demand for such securities in New Zealand.     




•   confidence crises: Bad equilibria can occur in circumstances where taxes would 
have to rise substantially if all parties holding maturing debt refused to rollover.  For 
example, in times of fiscal stress the Crown could face substantial risk premia on its 
borrowings.  A ￿vicious circle￿ could develop where a confidence crisis results in 
rising interest rates and depreciating currency.  Such speculative attacks can force a 
country to repudiate its debt.  A long and balanced maturity structure avoids the 
crisis equilibrium by limiting the potential tax increase below the trigger level for 
repudiation;
22
  and 
•   low inflation as reputational equilibrium: The effectiveness of surprise inflation as a 
method of repudiating debt is enhanced if debt has long maturity, is non-indexed, 
and denominated in domestic currency.  Thus, to sustain a reputation for low 
inflation as total debt increases the optimal policy is to reduce debt maturity (and 
increase foreign currency denomination).  Due to the ￿fixed cost￿ of reputation loss, 
the reputation constraint binds only at high levels of debt: if debt is below the 
threshold level there is no constraint on maturity and currency denomination.   
The results above place the onus on debt structure for underpinning time-consistent fiscal 
and monetary policies.  In the New Zealand context, institutional arrangements such as 
the Reserve Bank Act 1989 and Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 are further instruments to 
achieve time-consistent policy.  An issue is whether the institutional arrangements 
eliminate entirely the need to structure the Crown portfolio to meet time-consistency 
objectives or whether they merely relax the level of restraint that should be embodied in 
portfolio policy targets.  This issue is pursued in Section 11.   
Summary for time-consistency 
 
Economic objective: 
Minimise the risk of creating unstable fiscal and monetary policies  
CFP objectives:  
Portfolio policy: Minimise the Crown￿s incentive to devalue or repudiate debt (and other liabilities) 
Targets:  
(a)  upper bound on net debt, particularly local currency debt where achieving a low-inflation 
reputation equilibrium; 
(b) in event that debt exceeds threshold in (a), set lower bounds on average maturity, proportions 
of price-indexed and foreign-currency denominated debt; and 
(c)  upper bound on quantity of debt maturing in any year (or relevant period), consistent with 
avoiding risk of confidence crises. 
Instruments:  
Tax rate and/or sale of assets 
Re-weighting of liability structure (across denominations and maturities)   
Institutional arrangements (e.g. RBA 1989 and FRA 1994) 
 
                                                                 
21 Missale (1997) reports that research on maturity structure is at an early stage and that results differ across models.  In addition to 
the two results below, Missale reports conflicting results from Calvo and Guidotti￿s (1992) model of short-run opportunistic behaviour.  
However, their model omits any role for past behaviour to influence investors￿ expectations, and the results have been shown to not be 
robust to allowing the issue of price-indexed or foreign currency debt.  Therefore, I omit the results from this paper. 
22 In an open economy, government holdings of foreign exchange reserves may also assist in reducing the risk of confidence crises.  
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6  Agency costs of government 
Economic objective 
The economic objective in this section is to minimise public sector agency costs. 
Pinfield (1998) developed a simple model to demonstrate that the losses from 
￿expenditure creep￿ ￿ where an improving fiscal position increases the pressure for 
government spending  - may outweigh the gains from tax smoothing.  The model reflected 
that agency costs arise whenever Crown decision makers (politicians and bureaucrats) 
are imperfect agents of citizens.   
In general, delegation of decisions from principal to agent tends to work well when the 
agent has good information about the principal￿s best interests and strong incentives and 
capability to act accordingly.  Conversely, agency costs tend to be high when agents have 
poor information, weak incentives, and wide opportunity for discretion.   
Incentives 
Public choice theory assumes that Crown decision-makers act in their self-interest.  The 
theory predicts that: 
•   politicians (and bureaucrats), due to the need to win votes, have an incentive to 
promote government spending and investment favouring their special interest group 
constituents, even if such expenditure is inefficient;
23
 and 
•   politicians and bureaucrats, due to their (non-marketable) human capital exposure 
and (possibly) asymmetric loss function
24
, have an incentive to favour lower risk 
policies than otherwise would be optimal.  
Opportunities 
The opportunity for Crown decision-makers to act contrary to citizens￿ interests may arise 
in several forms: 
•   free cash flow: Application of Jensen￿s (1986) free cash flow model suggests that 
Crown decision-makers have greater opportunity to engage in inefficient spending 
and investments when substantial liquid assets have been accumulated on the 
Crown balance sheet and/or a ￿structural￿ budget surplus occurs;  
•   monitoring costs: A high risk strategy leading to greater volatility in the Crown￿s 
earnings stream (and components of it) may inhibit effective monitoring.  Highly 
complex strategies can also inhibit monitoring, e.g. Enron￿s balance sheet 
transactions; and 
•   large player issues: Crown portfolio investments may result in the Crown acquiring 
dominant shareholding positions in private sector companies, providing opportunity 
for politicians and bureaucrats to pursue their interests to the detriment of value 
maximisation.   
                                                                 
23 This does not imply that all government expenditure is inefficient but rather that incentives may result in some inefficiencies. 
24 The asymmetry arises because bad outcomes may be ￿career limiting￿ whereas good outcomes may confer limited benefits (usually 
enhanced reputation).  
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Key insights for policy  
The key implications for Crown financial policy are: 
•   tax policy objective: Rather than tax smoothing, limit free cash flows at source by 
favouring tax rates closer to balanced budget;  
•   portfolio policy objective: Use the structure of the Crown balance sheet as a fiscal 
anchor.  For example, set a lower bound on gross debt at a level that limits future 
borrowing capacity.  Another example would be to place an upper bound on the 
level of fungible assets, so that any substantive build up in Crown net worth would 
be in the form of non-fungible assets (e.g. investment in roads or other assets with 
significant political hurdles against sale of the asset).  Also, limit the share of any 
asset held by the Crown to avoid large player issues;   
•   institutional arrangements: To the extent that diversification implies the Crown 
should invest in liquid and fungible assets, institutional arrangements may reduce 
agency costs: 
-  improve the incentives on political decision makers through legislative or other 
requirements to make more transparent both intentions and subsequent 
performance, e.g. Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994; and/or 
-  shift decisions to non-political agents with better information, incentives and 
capability, and limit discretion remaining with politicians and bureaucracy, e.g. 
New Zealand Superannuation Act (NZSA) 2001 that establishes arrangements 
for the New Zealand Superannuation Fund.
25
 
A ￿pecking order￿ may be applicable.  First, an effective institutional arrangement that 
protects financial assets from political direction could alleviate the need to introduce 
balance sheet restrictions.  Institutional arrangements such as mandatory requirements on 
government to pay into a fund (e.g. New Zealand Superannuation Fund) may also reduce 
the proportion of any budget surplus available as ￿free cash flow￿, thereby reducing the 
risk of resources being diverted to inefficient government spending.   
Second, in the absence of strong institutional arrangements, a portfolio policy that invests 
surplus cash in non-fungible assets helps to protect against future raiding of accumulated 
assets.  To the extent that both institutional and portfolio policies are ineffective in 
reducing agency costs, the burden falls on tax policy in the sense of placing greater 
emphasis on balanced budget tax rates rather than tax smoothing. 
A caveat to this analysis (which is also applicable to time-consistency issues) is that 
restricting opportunities does not remove the underlying incentives.  Hence, use of the 
balance sheet and institutional arrangements as suggested above has the risk of inducing 
Crown decision makers to seek their desired outcomes through other mechanisms, 
possibly at greater cost in terms of economic efficiency.   
                                                                 
25 McCulloch (2003) describes the institutional arrangements of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund.  
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Summary for agency costs 
 
Economic objective: 
Minimise public sector agency costs 
CFP objectives:  
Tax policy: Minimise free cash flow  
Portfolio policy: Minimise fungible assets and capacity for further borrowing  
Institutional policy: Ensure decisions are transparent and made by agents with best information, 
incentives and capability 
Targets:  
(a)  Upper bound on cyclically-adjusted budget surplus (to trigger reduced tax rates) 
(b)  Upper bound on fungible assets set at a level to buffer against shocks 
(c) Lower bound on gross debt set consistent with limiting borrowing capacity 
(d)  Upper bound on share of assets held by the Crown 
Instruments:  
Tax rate 
Portfolio weights on fungible versus non-fungible asset classes 
Portfolio weights on total debt (gross or net depending on how constraint binds) 
Institutional arrangements (e.g. FRA 1994 and NZSA 2001) 
 
7  Provision of market maker services 
Economic objective 
The economic objective is to maximise the opportunities for New Zealand citizens and 
entities to engage in efficient risk sharing.   
The motivation for this objective relates to ￿missing markets￿.   The Although the potential 
to construct derivative contracts of almost infinite variation allows a small number of 
underlying securities to span a large state space, it is generally considered in the literature 
that capital markets are incomplete in relation to intergenerational risk and country risk 
(Shiller 1993).  If correct, such unexploited insurance opportunities suggest the possibility 
that Crown financial policy could improve welfare by issuing appropriate securities.  In 
some circumstances, the sovereign power of the state may confer a comparative 
advantage on the Crown as a provider of market maker services. 
Key insights for policy 
It has long been argued in the literature that the risk of default on private debt makes it 
impossible to create a private substitute for government debt (Tobin 1963 and Stiglitiz 
1983).  Formal models deriving particular circumstances where safe debt would improve 
opportunities for risk sharing between current generations and generations yet unborn are 
available in Fischer (1983) and Peled (1985).  Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) present an 
alternative rationale where government debt is superior to private sector instruments in 
the provision of liquidity services.   
Research on OLG models also suggests tentatively that there may be scope for the 
Crown to issue output-indexed securities for managing country risk and very long-term  
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debt for managing intergenerational risk (Gale 1990 and Shiller 1993).
26
  However, the 
literature also cautions that financial innovations could have detrimental impact on risk 
sharing and economic welfare.  In particular, it is important to take into account how the 
issue of new securities would alter the distribution of government expenditure, transfers 
and taxes across future states of nature.  A redistribution of risk across citizens could be 
welfare reducing.  
Summary for market maker service 
 
Economic objective: 
Maximise the opportunities for New Zealand citizens and entities to engage in risk sharing 
CFP objectives:  
Portfolio policy: Create and maintain markets for securities that improve risk sharing  
Targets:  
(a) lower bound on existing securities (e.g. safe debt) identified as important for risk sharing; and 
(b) issue new securities to bridge missing markets where this would be welfare-improving 
Instruments:  
Long-term debt 
Range of indexed securities 
 
8  Provision of risk management services 
Economic objective 
The economic objective is to achieve citizens￿ desired wealth portfolio, particularly 
meeting their desired risk tolerance.   
The motivation for this objective rests on the view that citizens may be in a weak position 
to manage their risk exposures, including their exposure to the Crown.  It is useful to think 
of potential barriers to efficient risk management in terms of information, incentives and 
capability: 
•   Information: Citizens may lack information about the risk/return properties of their 
exposure to the Crown (and exposures to other risks).  The transactions cost of 
gathering appropriate information may be too high or the information simply may not 
be available to citizens irrespective of willingness to pay. 
•   Incentives:   In general, citizens may be expected to have strong incentives to 
identify and manage risk exposures consistent with maximising their own welfare.  
However, public choice issues in a democratic political system may lead to moral 
hazard and therefore distorted incentives.  For example, citizens might assume 
rationally that the government of the day will provide retirement income, leading to 
reduced incentive for private savings. Another example is that taxation of return on 
capital also distorts incentives, possibly causing citizens to exacerbate their risk 
exposures (Coleman, 1997b). 
                                                                 
26 An output-indexed security would have the feature that the return payable on the security varies inversely with the level of GDP (or 
other output measure) of the economy.  
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•   Capability:   Citizens may lack capability to manage their risk exposures, for two 
reasons:  
-  citizens may not possess the capacity to make fully rational decisions 
consistent with their objectives.  Such ￿bounded rationality￿ may result in 
myopic decisions as individuals seek to simplify their decision problem 
through, for example, the use of finite planning horizons and ignoring readily 
available information; and 
-  capability to manage risks may be constrained by imperfect capital markets, 
such as liquidity constraints, short-selling restrictions, and trading margins.     
Missing markets or lack of access to market instruments may also present 
barriers to efficient risk management. 
Faced with these barriers, citizens have an incentive to delegate decisions to agents with 
better information, incentives and capability.  Private sector financial intermediaries such 
as banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds arise to provide risk management 
services of various forms.   
The motivation for this section is that in some circumstances the Crown may have a 
comparative advantage over the private sector in the provision of particular risk 
management services.   
Key insights for policy 
For the purposes of discussion, the following ignores the conceptual and practical 
difficulties relating to interpersonal welfare analysis.  These are discussed in Section 11. 
The general nature of optimal policy may be conjectured without analysing in detail each 
potential barrier.
27
  All that is required is recognition that some barriers may result in 
citizens being exposed to risks that desirably should be hedged, while other barriers may 
prevent citizens from achieving welfare-enhancing exposures.  For example, bounded 
rationality and missing markets (or lack of access to markets) could result in citizens 
taking unwarranted risk exposures, while liquidity constraints may prevent citizens from 
creating appropriate risk exposures (e.g. by borrowing to invest in risky assets).
28
  Short-
selling restrictions could work either way: they may prevent citizens from creating risk 
exposures and equally they may prevent citizens from unwinding risk exposures in 
situations where the Crown holds too much of an asset. 
Thus the first step to achieve the economic objective would involve identifying two sets of 
risk exposures: those exposures that should be mitigated and those exposures that 
should be created or increased.  Crown financial policy would aim to structure the Crown 
portfolio to have negative correlation with exposures to be mitigated and positive 
correlation with exposures to be created or increased.   
The analysis does not imply that the Crown portfolio should lie on the CML.  Rather, the 
objective requires only that citizens￿ total wealth portfolios be positioned appropriately on 
                                                                 
27 Formal models analysing the policy implications are sparse.  All predictions in this section need to be viewed as speculative until 
verified by further analysis.   
28 Coleman (1997a) discusses the effects of differential borrowing margins, whereby the government accesses capital markets at 
lower borrowing interest rate than available to citizens.  This is analytically similar but less extreme than liquidity constraints.  As 
Coleman points out, rather than risk management services, citizens who face either higher borrowing rates or liquidity constraints 
would prefer the government to borrow and on-lend to them.  For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that government has no 
comparative advantage in the provision of credit intermediation services.     
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the CML.  The location of the Crown portfolio in risk/return space would be determined by 
the asset and liability holdings required to ensure citizens￿ total wealth portfolio achieved 
the optimal risk/return target.  In contrast to Davis (2001) and Grimes (2001a), it is unlikely 
that this would translate into a generic risk/return specification for the Crown portfolio.   
Summary for risk management services 
 
Economic objective: 
Achieve citizens￿ desired risk/return trade-off on their total wealth portfolio 
CFP objectives:  
Portfolio policy: Crown portfolio has perfect negative correlation with all risks exposures that 
should be hedged and positive correlation with exposures that should be increased 
Targets:  
Specified risk exposures for the Crown portfolio (set to mitigate/create identified risks to citizens)  
Instruments:  
Portfolio weights  
 
9  Downside efficiency risks 
Economic objective 
The economic objective is to minimise the risk of exacerbating existing inefficiencies or 
creating new sources of inefficiency in the private sector.     
The motivation is that, although a market failure may exist, the limitations of government 
may mean that policy action would not improve economic welfare.  In essence, contrary to 
Sections 7 and 8, government provision of new or additional market maker and risk 
management services may not be justified because of the risk of making matters worse.  
Nevertheless, if Ricardian Equivalence fails, it would remain the case that the size and 
structure of the Crown balance sheet would impact on economic welfare.  Therefore, a 
relevant economic objective is to avoid exacerbating any existing inefficiencies or creating 
any new ones.   
Key insights for policy
29
 
A number of cases may be identified where Crown financial policy potentially should 
target the minimum-variance portfolio:     
•   Bounded rationality.  Bounded rationality implies that citizens would not take full 
account of the probability distribution of future tax rates (and government spending 
and transfers).  In the extreme, bounded rationality may lead to na￿ve forecasting of 
the tax rate, i.e. citizens assume the future tax rate will be the same as the current 
rate until the government announces otherwise.  A Crown financial policy aimed at 
minimising the variance of tax rates would validate such forecasts.   
More generally, even if citizens￿ forecasts are somewhat more sophisticated than 
na￿ve forecasting, intuition suggests that a minimum-variance policy would help to 
                                                                 
29 As with the previous section, formal models analysing the policy implications are sparse and detailed predictions need to be viewed 
as speculative until verified by further analysis.    
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minimise citizens￿ forecast errors, thereby minimising the risk that Crown financial 
policy exacerbates inefficiencies arising from bounded rationality.   
•   Costly information.  To the extent that information is costly to acquire and interpret, 
the principles of policy transparency discussed in Section 3 would apply.   
Transparency would at least allow financial intermediaries (as delegated agents) to 
acquire and interpret information on behalf of citizens.   
However, citizens would still be faced with making decisions with inadequate 
information.  If these conditions lead citizens to make na￿ve forecasts, a Crown 
financial policy aimed at minimising the variance of tax rates would minimise the risk 
of citizens making decision errors, thereby minimising the risk of inefficiency.   
•   Capital taxation.  Coleman (1997b) shows, in the presence of capital taxation, that a 
Crown financial policy of investing in risky assets creates an incentive for citizens to 
exacerbate risk exposures.  The incentive arises because good returns on the 
Crown portfolio lead to reduced tax rate on returns on individual portfolios, while bad 
returns on the Crown portfolio would lead to higher tax rates on individual portfolios.  
Citizens￿ therefore have an incentive to replicate the Crown portfolio so that their 
individual returns are correlated inversely with the tax rate.  A Crown financial policy 
aimed at minimising the variance of tax rates would minimise the incentive for 
citizens to exacerbate risk exposures.  
•   Liquidity constraints.  In Section 8 it was noted that liquidity constraints prevent 
some citizens from creating desired exposures by borrowing to invest in risky 
assets.  Binding liquidity constraints would also prevent citizens from smoothing 
consumption in the face of variability in income and wealth.  In this case, the 
Crown￿s objective could be to avoid being a cause of variability in citizen￿s income 
and wealth.  Consistent with Davis (2001) and Grimes (2001a), Crown financial 
policy would be aimed at minimising the variance of tax rates as a means to avoid 
exacerbating inefficiencies arising from liquidity constraints.  
Conflicting implications arising from short-selling restrictions 
In contrast to the arguments above in favour of targeting the minimum variance portfolio, 
other considerations suggest the Crown should be cautious in accumulating risky assets 
for tax smoothing purposes.  In the case where citizens face short-selling restrictions, a 
Crown investment strategy that placed too much weight on some assets relative to that 
desired by citizens would leave those citizens over-exposed to particular risks.  An 
objective of minimising downside risks would suggest placing upper bounds on the 
accumulation of assets that are not widely held by citizens, to avoid the risk of creating 
exposures that citizens would be unable to unwind. 
￿Large player￿ issues 
If the Crown￿s financial asset portfolio became large relative to the   
New Zealand capital market the risk would arise that the Crown￿s investment strategy 
could substantially alter domestic asset prices.  Distorted prices would reduce the 
allocative efficiency of capital markets.  Similarly, the Crown, as a large player, may 
acquire dominant shareholding positions in listed companies (as noted in Section 6).  The 
Crown could effectively convert a wide range of private sector companies into state-
owned entities, with the attendant risk that public choice considerations have an adverse 
impact on corporate governance.  The policy conclusion is that the Crown should be  
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restricted in its holdings of some asset classes (e.g. local shares) and some particular 
assets.   
Market maker services 
The discussion on market maker services in Section 7 concluded that issue of nominal 
government debt and various indexed securities may enhance economic welfare.  The 
objective in this section (of avoiding exacerbating any existing inefficiencies or creating 
any new ones) suggests a distinction be made between existing debt securities and 
financial innovations to issue securities with entirely new characteristics, e.g. country-
indexed securities.  The objective suggests that policy should ensure that existing 
benchmark securities continue to be maintained so as to avoid the risk of creating new 
missing markets that would occur if private sector financial innovation did not replace any 
government security withdrawn from the market place.  This would protect against 
downside risks relative to the status quo.   
A similar argument applies in terms of avoiding the risk of increasing liquidity premia.  To 
the extent that a liquid secondary market has already developed on the basis of the 
current debt structure, reducing key debt instruments below threshold levels carries the 
risk of increasing liquidity premia.  At a minimum, even if private sector instruments would 
eventually fill the gap, higher liquidity premia would apply during a transition period during 
which public debt is being run down but the secondary market in private market 
instruments had yet to become fully liquid. 
Summary for downside efficiency risk  
 
Economic objective: 
Minimise the risk of exacerbating existing inefficiencies or creating new sources of inefficiency in 
the private sector 
CFP objectives:  
Portfolio policy:  
(a) minimise the risk of materially affecting asset prices; 
(b) minimise the risk of materially affecting corporate governance; 
(c) minimise the risk of creating exposures that citizens cannot unwind (e.g. due to short-selling 
restrictions); 
(d) minimise the risk of creating new missing markets or causing an increase in liquidity premia; 
and 
(e) possibly aim for minimum-variance portfolio (depending on source of market imperfection) 
Targets:  
(a) upper bound on portfolio weights on assets consistent with (a) ￿ (c) above; 
(b)  lower bound on portfolio weights on benchmark debt instruments consistent with (d) above; 
and 
(c) minimum-variance portfolio (possibly)  
Instruments:  
Portfolio weights  
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10  Summary of objectives and targets  
This section summarises the results of the previous sections to provide an overview of the 
policy targets relevant to each objective (refer Table 1 below).     
Distortionary taxation 
The objective of minimising the deadweight losses of taxation has been analysed across a 
range of assumptions.  A clear conclusion from all models is that all diversifiable risk 
should be hedged by ensuring the Crown portfolio lies on the Capital Market Line.  The 
distortionary tax objective also supports smoothing of the tax rate over the economic cycle 
and pre-funding of an anticipated permanent increase in government spending (also 
referred to as deterministic smoothing). 
Other policy targets are conditional on particular assumptions.  If citizens are fully rational 
and not constrained by imperfect capital markets, policy should target the minimum-
variance portfolio, i.e. in addition to eliminating diversifiable risk, policy should minimise 
systematic risk up to the maximum extent permitted by available instruments.  If citizens 
do not alter their portfolios optimally in response to changes in the Crown portfolio, the 
appropriate policy may involve targeting a level of systematic risk greater than the 
minimum feasible level.   
If markets are incomplete then policy should consider building a positive balance of CNW 
to protect against unhedged risks.  This policy conclusion applies if innovations in 
consumption and the tax rate are negatively correlated. 
An upper bound on gross debt (or on particular debt instruments) should apply in the case 
where high levels of debt would attract an unjustified premium for default risk. 
Time-consistency 
The time-consistency objective embodies two main concerns.  The first is the incentive for 
government to reduce the real value of debt outstanding through unexpected inflation, 
new taxes or outright repudiation.  In this case, policy should set an upper bound on net 
nominal debt so that these incentives are kept in check.  Where the main risk is 
unexpected inflation (rather than new taxes or repudiation) the upper bound would be set 
on net local currency debt.   
If total debt exceeds the upper bound then a portion of the debt should be denominated in 
foreign currencies and/or indexed to inflation.  Shortening the average maturity of debt 
also helps mitigate incentives for unexpected inflation. 
The second main concern is the risk of a refinancing crisis whereby investors collectively 
refuse to roll over maturing debt at reasonable interest rates.  The policy response implied 
by the literature is to set an upper bound on the volume of debt maturing in any year.    
WP 03/21 |  OBJECTIVES, TARGETS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR CFP  26  
Table 1 ￿ Summary of objectives and targets 
 
Objectives  Targets 
Policy neutrality: Maximise 
the potential for gross size 
and composition of the 
Crown balance sheet to be 
neutral for economic 
welfare 
No specific targets identified as optimal.  For purposes of 
transparency, the government should announce a risk/return 
target but otherwise may allow the Crown balance sheet to evolve 
as residual of government operating policies.   
 
Distortionary taxation: 
Minimise the expected 
economic value of 
deadweight losses of 
taxation: 
 
Tax smoothing over economic cycle 
Tax smoothing over anticipated permanent changes in 
government expenditure 
1.  Linear DWL function  Zero diversifiable risk (i.e. portfolio on CML) 
2.  Convex DWL function  Zero-variance portfolio (i.e. zero diversifiable and systematic risk) 
3.  Incomplete markets  Minimum-variance portfolio (i.e. zero diversifiable risk and 
minimum systematic risk) 
Positive net worth buffer (if & only if negative correlation)  
4.  Unjustified default risk  Upper bound on total debt and/or particular instruments subject to 
unjustified premia 
5.  Non-responsive citizens  Specified level of systematic risk (exceeding minimum variance) 
Time-consistency: 
Minimise the risk of creating 
unstable fiscal and 
monetary policies 
Upper bound on total net debt.  If debt exceeds threshold, then 
lower bounds on average maturity, price-indexed and foreign-
currency debt 
Upper bound on quantity of debt maturing in any year  
Agency cost : Minimise 
public sector agency costs 
Upper bound on cyclically-adjusted budget surplus 
Upper bound on fungible assets  
Lower bound on gross debt  
Market maker services: 
Maximise the opportunities 
for New Zealand citizens 
and entities to engage in 
risk sharing 
Lower bound on existing securities (e.g. safe debt) identified as 
important for risk sharing 
Issue new securities to bridge missing markets where this would 
be welfare-improving 
Risk management 
services: Achieve citizens￿ 
desired risk/return trade-off 
on their total wealth portfolio 
Specified risk exposures for the Crown portfolio (set to 
mitigate/create identified risks to citizens) 
Downside efficiency risk: 
Minimise the risk of 
exacerbating existing 
inefficiencies or creating 
new sources of inefficiency 
in the private sector 
Upper bound on share of any financial asset held by Crown 
Lower bound on benchmark debt instruments 
Minimum-variance portfolio (possibly) with returns equal to risk 
free rate   
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Agency cost 
The agency cost objective recognises that politicians and bureaucrats sometimes face 
weak or misaligned incentives.  Mechanisms that limit the potential for policy makers to 
act contrary to the interests of citizens include constraining the size of the cyclically-
adjusted operating surplus, limiting the build up of fungible assets, and maintaining net 
debt above a lower bound to put pressure on governments to favour efficient rather than 
inefficient spending. 
Market maker services 
Missing markets ￿ particularly in relation to intergenerational and country risk ￿ suggest 
the possibility that welfare may be improved through the issue of government securities 
that would enhance risk-sharing opportunities.  A corollary is that policy should place a 
lower bound on the outstanding volume of any existing securities identified as important 
for risk sharing. 
Risk management services 
The potential role of government as a provider of risk management services is motivated 
by the view in some papers that some citizens may be in a weak position to manage their 
own risk exposures.  The models assume implicitly that the government would have a 
comparative advantage over the private sector in the provision of such services.   
Downside efficiency risk 
The downside risk objective has three components.  The first component relates to the 
role of tax smoothing as a risk management tool in circumstances where citizens lack the 
information, incentive, or capability to manage their wealth portfolios optimally.  The 
appropriate policy targets are similar to the case of distortionary taxation.   
The second and third components relate to the risks of the Crown being a large player in 
the local market and the risk sharing and liquidity benefits of benchmark debt securities.  
The former implies that the Crown￿s holding of any financial asset should not exceed a 
threshold share of the asset.  The latter implies that the volume of benchmark debt 
maturities should be maintained above lower bounds.  Both policy targets are consistent 
with the status quo.   
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11  Selection of objectives for policy design 
The analysis above has identified seven potential objectives for Crown financial policy.  
Ideally, the objectives would be evaluated within a comprehensive empirical framework.  
However, from a practical perspective, taking forward all objectives to inform the design of 
alternative policy options would be undesirable.  This section assesses whether any 
objectives should be rejected a priori from further consideration.  Rejection at this stage 
would not foreclose the objective being considered further once policy options associated 
with other objectives have been considered fully.  The section also assesses the potential 
conflicts between the selected objectives. 
The conclusion of this section is that the design of policy options should proceed without 
further consideration of objectives related to policy neutrality and any new market maker 
and risk management services.  Rejection of additional ￿service provider￿ motivations is 
consistent with conclusions reached in Skilling (1997) as discussed in the Introduction.  In 
this formulation, government debt would be retained as an existing market maker service, 
being incorporated through the objective relating to downside efficiency risk. 
11.1  Criteria for rejecting an objective 
Subjecting the objectives to a priori tests incurs the risk of two types of error: 
•   false negative error: Rejection of an objective that would be accepted by more 
complete empirical and judgemental analysis; and 
•   false positive error:  Acceptance of an objective that would be rejected by more 
complete empirical and judgement analysis. 
The critieria should result in low risk of false negative error but be more forgiving with 
respect to false positive errors since the later are likely to be picked up during subsequent 
analysis of policy options.  More generally, the criteria should be self-evident, enduring 
and consistent with the principles of efficient policy design.   
The criteria applied below are as follows: 
•   infeasible: Reject an objective if implementation of Crown financial policy to achieve 
the objective would not be feasible; 
•   comparative disadvantage: Reject an objective if Crown financial policy would be at 
comparative disadvantage in achieving the objective relative to other instruments;  
•   non-binding: Reject an objective if the policy settings implied by the objective would 
in practice be non-binding on Crown balance sheet variables; or  
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11.2  Application of criteria 
Table 2 summarises the judgements in relation to each objective.  Two of the seven 
objectives ￿ relating to provision of market maker and risk management services ￿ are 
judged as failing the criteria.  
Market maker services 
With the exception of safe debt as discussed above, the role of government as provider of 
market maker services potentially fails three of the rejection criteria:  
•   implementation may not be feasible for substantive innovations such as the issue of 
securities indexed by country output or government spending;   
•   it is not obvious that the government possesses a comparative advantage over the 
private sector in the provision of new securities to fill missing markets.  Unless 
specific reasons are identified to the contrary, we should assume the barriers faced 
by private market makers would apply also to the government; and 
•   in the event the government did expand its market maker service, it is not known 
whether the specific new instruments created for this purpose would contravene 
constraints implied by other objectives. To the extent that such securities would 
need to be issued only up to the level sufficient to sustain a liquid trading market, it 
would seem unlikely that such policies would materially constrain the risk/return 
properties of the overall Crown balance sheet.  If this is the case, then the welfare 
benefits of providing additional market maker services could be investigated 
independently of the other policy options; 
These factors suggest that the design of policy options for managing the Crown balance 
sheet should proceed without further consideration of ￿market maker services￿.   
Risk management services 
Government provision of risk management services potentially fails two of the criteria.  
First, implementing a risk management service on behalf of citizens would face formidable 
information problems and issues associated with interpersonal welfare comparisons.  
Second, any Crown financial policy designed for the purpose of providing risk 
management services would need to demonstrate a net welfare benefit relative to the 
status quo and other alternative policies.  The latter would require comparison with a 
range of social policies available to protect disadvantaged citizens against risk exposures.  
These difficulties suggest that it would not be possible to implement a risk management 
service with high assurance of positive net welfare benefits.   
 
In addition to the two objectives discussed above, four of the five remaining objectives 
could fail one or more of the criteria.  For three of objectives, it is judged that sufficient 
doubt remains as to warrant including them in the set of objectives to take forward for 
further analysis.  
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Table 2 ￿ Application of rejection criteria 
 






Crown balance sheet 
Policy 
neutrality 




to extent that variance-











Possibly yes for 
monetary policy 
through institutional 
arrangements such as 
RBA ￿89 
Fiscal policy: No 
Possibly yes for 
monetary policy if 
legislative protections 
are sufficient 
Fiscal policy: An 
empirical issue 
Agency cost    
- 
Possibly yes if 
legislative protections 
sufficient 





Yes, to extent that 
barriers prevent issue 
of country- and govt 
spending-indexed 
securities 
Possibly yes, as not 
clear why govt could 
avoid the barriers that 
inhibit private sector 
filling the missing 
markets 
Possibly yes, if  only 





Probably yes, as 
information 
requirements very 
large (govt. lacks 
capacity for ￿fine 
tuning￿) 
Possibly yes, as social 
welfare policies likely 
to target particular 




- - - 
 
Note: Absence of firm view indicated by ￿-￿ 
 
                                                                 
30 The variance-covariance matrix is a matrix which has the variances of asset returns in the diagonal and covariances of returns 
between pairs of assets (or liabilities) in remaining cells (Copeland and Weston 1988).   
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Distortionary taxation 
Tax smoothing involves hedging risks to the Crown balance sheet so that value changes 
in one part of the portfolio are balanced by changes in other parts, so that there is no 
need to alter tax rates to make up the difference.  Successful hedging requires knowledge 
of the variance-covariance matrix of returns on assets and liabilities and that these 
parameters are relatively stable over time.   Tax smoothing carries the significant risk of 
implementation failure due to uncertainties about variance-covariance parameters and 
their stability over time.  The uncertainties are especially large for those Crown assets and 
liabilities that are non-marketable since, by definition, their returns are not directly 
observable.  
These implementation risks apply mainly to tax smoothing over states of nature.  Tax 
smoothing over time (involving, for example, pre-funding of anticipated future government 
expenditure) is less vulnerable to these risks.  A further mitigating factor is the possibility 
that substantial hedging may be achieved through debt management structures 
(Angeletos, 2002). 
The overall judgement of this author is that implementation risk may limit the extent of 
certain forms of tax smoothing but does not render infeasible all forms of smoothing.   The 
distortionary taxation objective should remain as potentially an important determinant of 
Crown financial policy. 
Time-consistency 
The Reserve Bank Act 1989 may be viewed as an alternative to Crown financial policy as 
an instrument to achieve time-consistency in monetary policy.  To this extent, the policy 
conclusions implying upper and lower bounds on various debt securities may be non-
binding and irrelevant. 
However, since any future Parliament could amend or repeal the Reserve Bank Act there 
could be circumstances in which the structure of the Crown balance sheet becomes 
relevant.
31
  Given that Huther (1998), Fabling (2002) and Davis and Fabling (2002) 
conclude the optimal Crown balance sheet could be several orders of magnitude larger 
than currently (e.g. financial assets and liabilities over 2500% of GDP) it is quite possible 
that constraints motivated by time-consistency could be breached. 
On this basis, the judgement is that the Reserve Bank Act should be viewed as relaxing 
but not eliminating a role for Crown financial policy, i.e. constraints motivated by time-
consistency of monetary policy should be included as relevant factors in the design of 
alternative options for Crown financial policy.   
Agency costs 
Legislative arrangements such as the New Zealand Superannuation Act 2001 provide a 
level of protection against agency costs in the build up of financial assets.  Again, such 
arrangements would tend to relax rather than eliminate the constraints.  The judgement is 
that the constraints motivated by agency costs are likely to be highly relevant in the design 
of alternative policy options.   
                                                                 
31 Even in the absence of legislative changes, the frequent changes to the Policy Targets Agreement since establishment of the 
Reserve Bank Act indicates the potential for policy to be reinterpreted over time.  Another example is the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
1994, where the definition of the debt target was changed in 1999 from a net to gross basis.   
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Policy neutrality 
Conclusions regarding policy neutrality emphasise the need for explicit decisions to be 
made and communicated transparently.  These conclusions, which would apply to all 
policy options including the status quo, have no implications for the tax rate or size or 
structure of the Crown balance sheet.  The conclusions would not affect the design of 
policy options for managing the Crown balance sheet other than in a very general way. 
The remaining objective is the downside efficiency risk.  This is judged as probably 
meeting the four criteria.   
11.3 Conflicting  targets 
The four main objectives imply a range of targets could be adopted for the Crown balance 
sheet, some of which would be conflicting.  Three potential conflicts arise from 
distortionary taxation, time-consistency, and agency cost (see Figure 3 below):   
•   the distortionary taxation and agency cost objectives tend to conflict over tax rates and 
hence the Operating Balance (OB) and accumulation of fungible assets.  The 
distortionary tax objective subjugates the level of the Operating Balance and fungible 
assets to the needs of hedging risk (to smooth tax rates), whereas the agency cost 
objective implies the tax rate should adjust to limit operating surpluses and prevent 
any significant build up of fungible assets; 
•   the time-consistency and agency cost objectives tend to conflict over debt levels.  The 
time-consistency objective implies low debt levels so that the risk premium is low or 
zero. The agency cost objective implies high debt as a discipline on government 
spending; and 
•   the distortionary tax objective may or may not conflict with the time-consistency 
objective in terms of debt levels.  The distortionary tax objective may reinforce the low 
debt target to the extent that high debt would lead to ￿unjustified￿ risk premia on 
sovereign debt.  However, if unjustified risk premia do not occur at any level of debt 
then a policy aimed at smoothing tax rates may imply aggressive leveraging of the 
balance sheet to fund the acquisition of financial assets.    
WP 03/21 |  OBJECTIVES, TARGETS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR CFP  33  
 








12 Conclusions   
The potential for Crown financial policy to have real effects on the economy raises the 
obvious question as to how policy should be set to maximise economic welfare.  As a first 
step to answering this question, this paper organises the literature on Crown financial 
policy around the policy framework of objectives, targets and instruments.   
In this context, the Crown balance sheet may be viewed as an instrument available to 
target one or more economic policy objectives.  Equally, the framework recognises that 
other instruments unrelated to Crown financial policy may be available to target one or 
more objectives.   
Seven distinct policy objectives have been identified as potentially relevant for ensuring 
that Crown financial policy contributes to maximising economic welfare.  The paper has 
identified the policy targets and, where possible, specific instruments implied by various 
economic models.   
The main conclusion of the paper is that four objectives should be the main factors that 
inform the design of alternative policy options for Crown financial policy.  The four 
objectives relate to minimising distortionary taxation, time-consistency of policy, agency 
costs of government, and downside efficiency risk.  Three of these objectives imply 
targets that are potentially mutually conflicting.   
These results will serve as inputs to a future paper that takes into account these conflicts 
to fashion 2-3 alternative policy options for further analysis. 
 
Time-consistency 
Agency cost  Distortionary 
taxation 
Conflicting or mutually 
consistency debt target 
Limits vs. no 
limits on OB & 
fungible assets 
High vs. low 
debt target  
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Appendix:  The trade-off between the level and 
variability of the tax rate 
Introduction 
This Appendix is concerned with the standard tax-smoothing model where the excess 
burden of taxation is convex in the tax rate but the other Ricardian assumptions hold.  In 
particular, it is assumed that capital markets are perfect and complete and individuals and 
benevolent governments are rational decision makers.  In this context, Bohn (1990, 1995) 
shows in a world of uncertainty that government policy should focus on managing the 
Crown￿s aggregate balance sheet so as to minimise the variance of the tax rate.  Bohn￿s 
results are counter-intuitive, as at face value it would seem the government could choose 
a high return/high risk portfolio that reduces the expected tax level at the expense of 
higher variability of tax rates.  The tax-smoothing literature appears to be at variance with 
standard financial theory. 
This apparent contradiction has been something of a puzzle.  Skilling (1997, p.14) 
suggested that it is ￿misleading to examine one of these factors [level and variability of the 
tax rate] in isolation, as it is the combination of these factors which generate the total 
deadweight loss.￿  Grimes (2001b) verifies Bohn￿s conclusions by numerical simulation 
but does not explain why they hold.  He also questioned their robustness to cases where 
the Ricardian assumptions have been relaxed.  
The purpose of this Appendix is to explain the result in Bohn (1990, 1995).  The analysis 
is not intended to imply that a trade-off could not exist in other models with different 
assumptions.   
The Appendix is divided into four sections:   
•   a brief review of two special cases where the absence of a risk/return trade-off is 
clear; 
•   intuition for Bohn￿s results with consumption-CAPM model; 
•   intuition for Bohn￿s results with exogenous asset prices; and 
•   a comment on potential weaknesses in Bohn￿s model. 
Two special cases 
Bohn has presented several special cases where it is intuitively clear that policy should 
focus on minimising the variability of the tax rate.  Two particular cases occur where: 
•   citizens and/or investors are risk neutral (refer Bohn 1990); and 
•   fiscal risks are diversifiable (refer Bohn, 1995, p.35).
32
 
In the first case, where parties are risk neutral, the price of systematic risk would be 
zero.
33
  In this case, all securities would have equal expected returns.  Thus, there would 
                                                                 
32 Fiscal risks comprise shocks to government expenditure, the tax base, and the market value of existing assets and liabilities on the 
Crown balance sheet.  
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be no risk/return trade-off on portfolio returns and therefore no exploitable opportunity 
available to policy makers.  Convexity of the deadweight loss function therefore implies 
that policy should focus on minimising the variability of the tax rate. 
In the second case, where fiscal risks are diversifiable, all fiscal risks may be hedged 
without cost in terms of forgoing portfolio expected returns.  This result occurs because 
the price of diversifiable risk is zero.  The result applies irrespective of the risk tolerance of 
citizens and/or investors.  
The general case with consumption-CAPM model 
Bohn (1995) shows the policy conclusion in favour of minimising the variability of tax rates 
continues to hold in the general case where:  
•   citizens and investors may be risk averse or risk neutral;  
•   fiscal risks may include a systematic component; and  
•   asset prices may be determined in accord with an equilibrium pricing model or 
exogenously.   
Under these conditions, Bohn￿s result appears counter-intuitive since financial theory 
implies that hedging the systematic component would incur a cost in terms of lower 
portfolio expected return.   It would appear that the risk/return trade-off applicable to 
portfolio returns should carry over to a trade-off between the level and variability of the tax 
rate. 
To understand the fallacy of this intuition it is useful for the purposes of this Appendix to 
assume that asset prices are determined according to the consumption-CAPM model.
34
  
This could be relevant to a closed economy where optimality would imply citizens￿ 
consumption choices and asset prices are jointly determined. 
Two key factors are important for understanding the policy conclusion in favour of 
minimising the variability of tax rates:    
•   first, from the perspective of citizens, the Crown portfolio is one of several sub-
portfolios making up their total portfolio.  Frictions can place the managers of a sub-
portfolio at a comparative disadvantage in providing the risk/return trade-off desired 
on the total portfolio, e.g. tax distortions may place the Crown sub-portfolio at a 
comparative disadvantage; and 
•   second, in an equilibrium model, deadweight losses should not be evaluated by 
applying constant discount rates in an NPV calculation.  Instead, in a closed 
economy the equilibrium discount rate varies with the marginal utility of 
consumption.  This means that any reduction in deadweight losses in states of 
nature where marginal utility is low (i.e. high consumption) is less valuable than in 
states where the marginal utility is high (i.e. low consumption).  As a result, 
calculating the net present value (NPV) of losses at constant discount rates would 
not reflect accurately the economic value to consumers. 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Standard financial theory assumes investors are risk averse, so that the price of systematic risk is positive.  (This should not be 
confused with non-systematic or diversifiable risk, which has price of zero irrespective of investors￿ risk tolerance). 
34 This assumption is relaxed in the next section.    
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These two factors come together to produce the Bohn (1995) result.  A convex 
deadweight loss function places the Crown sub-portfolio at a comparative disadvantage 
by increasing the spread of returns (net of tax): Bad returns on the Crown portfolio are 
very bad because they induce higher tax rates and therefore higher deadweight losses as 
well as lower after-tax returns on citizens￿ other sub-portfolios; Good returns are very good 
because they induce lower taxes and therefore lower deadweight losses as well as higher 
after-tax returns on other sub-portfolios.  Hence, except where assets are negatively 
correlated with the tax rate, this unfortunate distribution of tax rates means that switching 
an asset from the Crown￿s portfolio to a portfolio held directly by individuals would reduce 
the variance of returns on citizens total wealth portfolios.    
In addition, an inherent feature of equilibrium in the consumption-CAPM model is that the 
assets offering high expected returns are precisely those assets that produce high payoffs 
in states when consumption is high (low marginal utility) and low payoffs when 
consumption is low (high marginal utility).  These assets must offer a higher expected 
return to compensate for their unfortunate distribution of payoffs (relative to the distribution 
of marginal utility).  Hence, it is clear that an investment by the Crown in ￿high return￿ 
assets to reduce the expected NPV of deadweight losses (at constant discount rates) 
potentially could have negative economic value to consumers.  
The proof that such investments necessarily would confer negative value to consumers 
derives from the Crown￿s comparative disadvantage as portfolio manager.  The 
unfortunate distribution of tax rates (as described above) exacerbates the unfortunate 
distribution of gross payoffs from ￿high return￿ assets.  Thus, citizens￿ would prefer to use 
one or more of their own sub-portfolios rather than the Crown sub-portfolio to optimise 
their holdings of risky assets.  For these reasons, within this model, it is always best to 
assign the Crown the task of immunising its portfolio so as to eliminate citizens￿ exposure 
to the Crown, i.e. policy should minimise the variance of the tax rate.     
The general case with exogenous asset prices 
The result derived for the consumption-CAPM model applies also when asset prices are 
determined by other equilibrium models (e.g. APT) or determined exogenously.  Bohn 
(1995, Section 2) adopts the assumption of exogenous asset prices by writing his model 
in terms of prices for general state-contingent claims.  This approach is relevant to a small 
open economy, such as New Zealand, where asset prices are determined by international 
capital flows.   
Much of the intuition of the previous section still applies.  Given asset prices, optimising 
citizens maximise utility by trading-off the level and variability of consumption, which they 
implement through their choice of asset holdings.  To the extent that citizens￿ income risks 
are diversifiable then their asset holdings would achieve smooth consumption at high 
average levels.  However, to the extent that citizens￿ income risks include a systematic 
component, then by definition the equilibrium profile of consumption chosen by rational 
consumers would result in the marginal utility of consumption being low when asset 
payoffs are high (and vice versa).  Similarly, the Crown portfolio still faces a comparative 
disadvantage relative to other sub-portfolios.    




The result above may be illustrated by a simple example involving one riskless asset 
earning r (assumed equal to zero) and one risky asset earning expected return of R.   
Suppose that in state s1 (with probability 0.75) the risky asset has an excess return of 4 
percent, and that in state s2 (with probability 0.25) it has an excess return of -4 percent. 
The expected excess return is thus 2 percent.  
Given this exogenous distribution of asset payoffs, a rational consumer would hold assets 
such that the distribution of marginal utility is uncorrelated with the distribution of asset 
returns, i.e. such that E[u′ (c).(Rt+1-rt+1)]=0, where u′ (c) is the marginal utility of 
consumption and E is the expectations operator.  Further, suppose that u′ (c(s1)) = 1 in 
state s1.  Then u′ (c(s2)) must equal 3 for this expectation to hold. 
Now suppose that if the government makes an investment it can either reduce taxes by 1 
percent in state 1 or increase them by 1 percent in state 2. Assume a quadratic 
deadweight loss function, h(τ ) = τ
2.
 With an initial tax rate of 0.3, the marginal deadweight 
losses in the two states will be 0.58 and 0.62 respectively. When these are weighted by 
the respective marginal utility weights, the expected economic value to citizens is -0.03.    
Grimes (2001b) obtains similar results in a range of numerical simulations.     
Potential weaknesses 
As noted above, the purpose of this Appendix is to clarify the rationale for Bohn￿s 
theoretical results and why they are consistent with financial theory.  No claim is made 
that the Bohn model is appropriate for analysing policy options for the New Zealand 
economy.   
Bohn (1990, footnote 5) and Bohn (1995, p.28) take comfort that his results are robust to 
any form of equilibrium asset pricing model and indeed to the case where asset prices are 
exogenous.  Bohn￿s comments are in reaction to the Equity Risk Premium Puzzle, 
whereby the main theoretical asset pricing models, such as the consumption-CAPM and 
APT have received, at best, very limited empirical support.     
However, irrespective of how asset prices are determined, Bohn￿s results rely on citizens 
making fully rational consumption and investment decisions.  In this respect, the empirical 
failure of the consumption-CAPM model is a failure of joint hypothesis about both 
consumption behaviour and asset pricing.  From this perspective, the empirical failure 
potentially strikes at the heart of tax smoothing as Bohn￿s results rely heavily on the 
relation between consumption and asset prices implied by equilibrium models.   
Looking ahead, a crucial issue is to achieve a better theoretical understanding of 
observed behaviour of consumption and asset prices. 
                                                                 
35 This example is from Coleman (1997a).  
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Glossary 
APT    Arbitrage pricing theory 
CAPM   Capital asset pricing model 
CFP    Crown financial policy 
CML    Capital market line 
CNW    Comprehensive net worth 
DWL   Deadweight  loss 
FRA    Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, New Zealand Parliament 
GDP    Gross domestic product 
IBC    Inter-temporal budget constraint 
NPV    Net present value 
NZSA    New Zealand Superannuation Act 2001, New Zealand Parliament 
NZSF    New Zealand Superannuation Fund 
OB    Operating Balance in Crown Financial Statements 
RBA    Reserve Bank Act 1989, New Zealand Parliament 
rf    Risk-free rate of return 